Ministering (In)Justice: The Supreme Court\u27s Misreliance on Abortion Regret in Gonzales v. Carhart by Ehrlich, J. Shoshanna
17 NEV. L.J. 599, EHRLICH - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  11:49 AM 
 
599 
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COURT’S MISRELIANCE ON ABORTION 
REGRET IN GONZALES V. CARHART 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, in the case of Gonzales v. Carhart,1 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the federal “Partial-Birth” Abortion Ban Act of 2003 criminaliz-
ing the performance of intact dilation and evacuation (“D & E”) abortions un-
less necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. Discounting expert tes-
timony that this late second trimester procedure, in which the fetus is removed 
from the uterus intact, may be a woman’s safest option,2 the Court instead de-
ferred to the determination of Congress that these abortions bear a “disturbing 
similarity” to the “killing of a newborn infant.”3 The Court further asserted in 
accord with Congressional findings that these procedures had a “power to de-
value human life,” and that a ban was therefore appropriate in order to draw “a 
bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.”4 
Laying the foundation for its embrace of the abortion regret trope, which is 
the focus of this Article, the Court indicated that this procedure is inherently 
incompatible with women’s true nature in light of the fact that “[r]espect for 
human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for 
                                                        
*  Professor, Women’s and Gender Studies Department, University of Massachusetts, Bos-
ton. This article is part of a larger research project being undertaken in collaboration with 
Alesha Doan, Associate Professor, School of Public Affairs & Administration, and Political 
Science, University of Kansas. I am grateful for the opportunity to work with such an enthu-
siastic, and brilliantly insightful colleague. This article has also benefitted from the excellent 
research assistance provided by the following students: Hui Chen, Hella Dijsselbloem, Gab-
by Fiore, and Caroline Reilly. I would like to acknowledge that select passages of this article 
are taken from an earlier chapter co-authored with Alesha Doan entitled: “Teaching Morality 
by Teaching Science”: Religiosity and Abortion Regret, in REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS: NEW 
CHALLENGES AND CONVERSATIONS, (Lisa Campo-Englestein & Paul Burcher, eds., forthcom-
ing 2017). 
1  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
2  Id. at 161. 
3  Id. at 158 (quoting Partial Ban Abortion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(L), 117 
Stat. 1201). 
4  Id. (quoting § 2(14)(G), (L)). 
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her child.”5 Grounded in this maternalist framing of female identity, while ac-
knowledging the lack of “reliable data to measure the phenomenon,” Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, nonetheless asserted it was “unexceptiona-
ble to conclude that some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant 
life they once created and sustained” and that “[s]evere depression and loss of 
esteem can follow.”6 In support of this proposition, the Court cited the amicus 
curiae brief filed by the conservative Justice Foundation on behalf of Sandra 
Cano7 (the original plaintiff in Doe v. Bolton,8 the companion case to Roe v. 
Wade)9 and “180 Women Injured by Abortion,” whose sworn testimonies of 
abortion trauma were solicited by Operation Outcry—a self-described ministry 
of the Justice Foundation.10 
Considerable criticism has been leveled at the Court’s invocation of regret 
to justify upholding the federal ban on intact D & E abortions. In this regard, 
some commentators have focused on the Court’s misuse/miscomprehension of 
the concept of regret itself (what I refer to as content-based concerns), while 
others have turned their critical gaze to the Court’s singular reliance on the Jus-
tice Foundation’s amicus brief to support its factual claim regarding the unex-
ceptional nature of abortion regret (what I refer to as process-oriented con-
cerns).11 
However, the religious origins and consolidating power of the abortion re-
gret trope have not received in-depth treatment in this body of critical scholar-
ship.12 This Article seeks to fill that gap. Following a discussion of some of the 
key themes raised in this literature, this Article then examines the deep religios-
ity of this trope as invoked by the Court. Tracking the above distinction be-
tween content and process, this exploration proceeds in two parts. First, the Ar-
                                                        
5  Id. at 159. 
6  Id. It should be noted that Congress did not actually make any findings regarding either 
women’s inherent maternalism or the likelihood of abortion regret. See Reva B. Siegel, Dig-
nity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L. 
J. 1694, 1698 (2008). 
7  Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 263 
(2011). 
8  410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
9  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10  Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured 
by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007) (No. 05-380) [hereinafter Brief of Sandra Cano]. 
11  I am purposefully avoiding the terms “substantive” and “procedural” as my focus is not 
on formal legal conventions or rules; rather, my interest lies in unpacking the psychological 
and cultural meanings of regret (content) and in tracing how the concept found its way into 
the Carhart decision (process). 
12  This is not to say that other authors have not discussed religious themes. See, e.g., Terry 
A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 897 
(2009); Siegel, supra note 6, at 1722; Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional 
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 
1673–75 (2008). 
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ticle interrogates the work of David C. Reardon, a prime architect of the “wom-
an-protective” antiabortion strategy, in order to unpack his impassioned eluci-
dation of regret as a psychological manifestation of a moral problem, experi-
enced by women who turn their backs on God’s plan for their lives. It then 
traces the revelatory origins of the legal strategy that brought the voices of 
“post-aborted” women to the Supreme Court by way of the amicus brief filed 
by the Justice Foundation with a focus on the troubling nature of the Court’s 
reliance on a divinely inspired authority as the sole basis for its factual finding 
regarding the unexceptional nature of abortion regret. In conclusion, the Article 
discusses the implications of the Court’s reliance on an inherently religious 
concept that was packaged as a legitimate secular rationale for upholding the 
challenged federal law—a rationale that has since infiltrated our political and 
legal discourse to support the assertion that abortion harms women.  
I.   REGRET MISCONSTRUED  
 The Carhart Court’s concern about post-abortion regret and the “severe 
depression and loss of esteem [that] can follow” was a central factor in its deci-
sion to uphold the federal ban on intact D & E abortions.13 However, its invoca-
tion of regret was not actually linked to this challenged procedure. Rather, as 
explained by the Court, the presumed emotional precarity of “a mother who 
comes to regret her choice to abort” primes her for greater psychological trau-
ma in the context of this procedure if her doctor fails to “disclose precise details 
of the means that will be used,” such that she does not learn until after the fact 
that she allowed him/her “to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing 
brain of her unborn child.”14 However, rather than, as urged by dissenting Jus-
tice Ginsberg, requiring disclosure of these details so as to enable women to 
make fully informed choices,15 the Court instead chose to uphold the federal 
ban on intact procedures in order to protect them from this presumptive cascade 
of emotional injuries.16 
                                                        
13  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. Protecting women from regret was not, however, the sole basis 
for the Court’s decision to uphold the law. For further discussion of the Carhart decision, 
see generally Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden 
Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010); Rebecca E. Ivey, Destabilizing Discourses: 
Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1451 (2008); Martha K. Plante, “Protecting” Women’s Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart 
Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s Equal Right to Personhood Under the Constitu-
tion, 16 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2008); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart 
and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2008). 
14  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159–60. 
15  Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
16  As I argue elsewhere, it is possible that the Court rejected an informed consent approach 
because, although disclosure of the details of this procedure may have served to avoid the 
enhanced emotional distress it associated with an intact D & E abortion, the majority Justices 
did not believe that any amount of information would suffice to alleviate the underlying re-
gret it associated generally with abortion in light of its maternalistic assumptions regarding 
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 The Court’s decision to opt for protectionism over disclosure brings us di-
rectly to what is perhaps the most significant criticism of the weight and mean-
ing it assigned to the concept of regret. Specifically, as Justice Ginsberg acerbi-
cally remarked in dissent, the majority invoked regret as a proxy for “ancient 
notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution . . . that 
have long since been discredited,” in order to justify depriving them “of the 
right to make an autonomous choice.”17 As Reva B. Siegel puts it, upon exami-
nation, the Court’s embrace of this “pro-woman” approach turns out to be a 
form of gender paternalistic reasoning, which like “the old gender paternalism” 
is based on “stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s roles” that serve 
to “deny women agency” for the ostensible purpose of protecting them “from 
coercion and/or freeing them to be mothers.”18 In short, regret effectively 
served as a safe cover under which Kennedy was able to successfully smuggle 
outmoded conceptions of women’s decisional competence into its abortion ju-
risprudence in order to deprive them of the right to choose an abortion proce-
dure it deemed barbaric. 
Other content-based critiques focus on the Court’s misapprehension of the 
psychological and cultural underpinnings of regret. According to Chris Guthrie, 
although the Court implicitly assumed that “a woman contemplating abortion is 
unable to anticipate the prospect of regret and is somehow caught off guard 
when she experiences it,” his examination of “an elaborate body of psychologi-
cal research” shows that among other critical decision-making strategies “most 
of us find the prospect of regret unappealing.”19 Accordingly, we tend to factor 
considerations of regret “into our decisionmaking and take steps to avoid it.”20 
Rather than being passive victims of a flawed decision-making process, 
Guthrie instead contends that most women will in fact anticipate the possibility 
of regret and actively factor this into their abortion decision. He thus argues 
that due to the Court’s failure to account for what he labels “regret aversion,” 
as well as other protective decisional strategies, it “should not abrogate the 
abortion right or any other Constitutional right on the basis of regret,”21 particu-
larly given that the “bulk of the empirical evidence on postabortion well-being 
. . . strongly suggests that most women fare quite well following abortion.”22 
                                                                                                                                 
women’s true nature. See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Turning Women into Girls: Abortion Regret 
and the Erosion of Decisional Autonomy, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 329, 354–55 (2014). 
17  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
18  Siegel, supra note 6, at 1792. 
19  Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 877, 881–82 (2008). 
20  Id. at 881. 
21  Id. at 882. In addition to the Court’s miscomprehension of “regret aversion,” as detailed in 
his article, Guthrie argues that it also failed to account for the dynamics of “regret overesti-
mation, regret dampening, and regret learning.” Id. 
22  Id. at 903. 
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Terry Maroney offers another perspective on the psychological underpin-
nings of regret, which she persuasively argues must be considered in conjunc-
tion with an individual’s own value system. Defining regret as a person’s belief 
that “she has made a negative self-evaluation based on past voluntary action 
now judged to be an avoidable mistake, and that she has coupled that evalua-
tion with a wish for an imagined reality that would have obtained had the action 
been different”23 she argues that by invoking the concept of regret in “close 
narrative conjunction with the invocation of mother-love,” the Carhart Court 
has implicitly infused the concept with a relativistic cultural meaning.24 
Specifically, by giving “regret pride of place,” Maroney argues that the 
Court is “subtly signaling endorsement of an account of the world in which 
abortion properly is regarded as the killing of a child by its mother,” and that it 
consequently “regards such regret as being a significant part of the natural or-
der of things,” in accordance with the Operation Outcry testimonials.25 Elabo-
rating, she explains that these testimonials reveal distinct belief structures, 
which, although “legitimate on their own terms,” as the expression of a 
worldview in which these women “have come to see themselves as mothers, 
their aborted fetuses as dead children, and the abortion as murder;”26 the per-
spective “underlying their emotional reality is not properly generalizable to 
other people, for it relies on [contested]—and, indeed, profoundly contested—
beliefs and values.”27 Accordingly, rejection of “any aspect of the underlying 
belief structure disrupts the resulting emotional consequences of abortion.”28 
Maroney is thus highly critical of the Court’s reliance on what she refers to 
as its “common sense” understanding of the emotion of regret, by which she 
means an “unreflective knowledge [that is] not reliant on specialized training or 
deliberative thought.”29 Accordingly, she argues that to “cabin the rights of all 
pregnant women . . . , even those for whom regret is a nonissue, is therefore to 
validate and privilege that contested set of underlying beliefs.”30 In short, much 
as Ginsberg’s view that regret is a stand-in for “ancient notions” about wom-
en’s roles and capacities, as presented by Maroney, it is a stand-in for a highly 
contextualized and contested understanding of the significance and impact of 
abortion in women’s lives. 
In addition to these content-based critiques, which effectively assert that 
the Court has misappropriated the concept of regret to justify depriving women 
of the ability to choose a procedure that it regarded as “laden with the power to 
                                                        
23  Maroney, supra note 12, at 892–93. 
24  Id. at 893. 
25  Id. at 891, 894. 
26  Id. at 894–96. 
27  Id. at 896. 
28  Id. at 897. 
29  Id. at 852. 
30  Id. at 899. 
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devalue human life,”31 other scholars have critiqued the Court’s reliance on a 
single authority, namely the amicus curiae brief filed by the Justice Foundation, 
to support its factual finding regarding the unexceptionalism of post-abortion 
regret. As developed below, this critique does not simply take aim at the Car-
hart decision; rather, it is enfolded within a growing body of scholarship which 
challenges the conventional wisdom that the “expertise-providing role for the 
amicus curiae is a good thing,” particularly when it comes to providing the 
Court with specialized factual knowledge.32 
Leading the way, Allison Orr Larsen forcefully argues that the time has 
come to re-evaluate this traditional knowledge-gap-filling role of amicus briefs 
in light of the dramatic upsurge in filings—a rise of 800 percent over the past 
fifty or so years33—coupled with the reality of a modern “data-rich and data-
hungry world,” in which vast amounts of information are but a click away; thus 
arguably making it increasingly difficult for the Justices “to sort the reliable 
amici information from the unreliable,”34 or, as Joëlle Anne Moreno puts it, “to 
distinguish science from its counterfeits.”35 Of particular concern in this regard 
is the Court’s reliance on amicus briefs as the basis for making findings of leg-
islative or social facts, which, in contradistinction to case-specific adjudicative 
facts, entail a generalized claim about the world,36 such as, for example, that 
abortion regret is unexceptional. 
According to Larsen, factual information contained in amicus briefs may 
be untrustworthy for a number of reasons. These include: reliance upon un-
published studies that are “on-file” with the author and not generally available 
for public review, rather than upon reputable peer-reviewed studies;37 the use of 
studies that were undertaken for purposes of litigation, and thus may not “fol-
low the scientific truth-seeking norms that regulate valid research;”38 or are 
based upon “the presentation of an authority who holds a minority view in his 
field without revealing the countervailing evidence.”39 
 Of course, these problematic submissions would be of less concern if the 
Justices were able to accurately sort the reliable from the unreliable briefs. 
                                                        
31  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158. 
32  Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1759–62 
(2014). 
33  Id. at 1758. 
34  Id. at 1762, 1765. 
35  Joëlle Anne Moreno, Extralegal Supreme Court Policy-Making, 24 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 451, 458 (2015). 
36  For further discussion of the difference between these kinds of facts, see Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1185, 1191–96 (2013). 
37  Larsen, supra note 32, at 1784–96. 
38  Id. at 1789 (quoting Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk So-
cial Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993)). 
39  Id. at 1795. 
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However, as documented by Michael Rustad and Thomas Koening, the authors 
of an early and influential study on the problematic nature of the Court’s reli-
ance on amicus briefs to establish social facts, the Justices lack an effective 
mechanism for reliably ascertaining whether “amici are distorting findings, cit-
ing unreliable data or drawing questionable normative arguments from incom-
plete data.”40 This is not simply an academic concern, as studies by both 
Larsen, as well as Rustad and Koening, uncovered multiple examples of the 
Court’s citation to briefs to establish legislative fact that rest on social science 
findings, which had been “distorted for partisan purposes” or did not otherwise 
conform to standard research norms.41 
Compounding the potentially problematic nature of the Court’s reliance on 
amicus briefs to establish legislative facts, in her study of the fact-based amicus 
briefs cited by the Court between 2008 and 2013, Larsen found that “[m]ore 
often than not a Justice citing an amicus brief to support a factual claim relies 
on only the amicus brief as authority without accompanying evidence (studies, 
articles, statistics, etc.) that can be found from within the brief.”42 She thus con-
cludes that rather than regarding them as “research tool[s],” the Justices have 
come to regard the amici themselves “as experts.”43 By way of further concern, 
as Larsen also found in her study, this thick reliance on amicus briefs does not 
just occur with respect to establishing facts that are peripheral to the Court’s 
decision on the merits, but also includes instances where the citation is “central 
to the Justice’s explanation for his or her decision.”44 In short, a single amicus 
may be cited to answer an “outcome-determinative question[].”45 
Turning this critical gaze on the Carhart decision, Justice Kennedy’s cita-
tion to the amicus brief filed by the Justice Foundation as the basis for its factu-
al finding regarding the unexceptionable nature of abortion regret is often held 
out as a prime example of the problematic nature of the Court’s reliance on  
these briefs to establish legislative facts. As an overarching concern, the brief is 
the sole referenced authority on this subject, thus implicitly elevating the Jus-
tice Foundation to the principal expert on women’s post-abortion experiences. 
However, although regret occupied, to quote Maroney, “pride of place”46 in the 
majority opinion, its conclusory encapsulation of women’s post-abortion emo-
tional experiences is grounded in highly problematic sources. 
First, the pages of the Justice Foundation’s amicus brief, relied upon by 
Justice Kennedy to support the abortion regret claim, draws upon the work of 
David C. Reardon whose minority views about the traumatic nature of abortion 
                                                        
40  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 38, at 152; see also Larsen, supra note 32, at 1762. 
41  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 38, at 94; see also Larsen, supra note 32, at 1784–1800. 
42  Larsen, supra note 32 at 1779 (emphasis in original). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 1783. 
45  Id. at 1782. 
46  Maroney, supra note 12, at 894. 
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have been soundly and consistently discredited by highly reputable organiza-
tions, including the American Psychological Association and the American 
Medical Association.47 Moreover, although Reardon is characterized in the 
brief as “one of the world’s leading experts on the effects of abortion on wom-
en,”48 as discussed below, his expertise is rooted in his religious belief that 
abortion disrupts God’s gendered order of creation. 
Second, in addition to referencing the work of Reardon, the specific pages 
cited by Justice Kennedy also include excerpts from the complete testimonies 
provided by the 180 women injured by abortion that are set-out in the brief’s 
appendix.49 As Linda Greenhouse makes clear, the group of women whose tes-
timonies are included in the Justice Foundation’s brief hardly constitutes a rep-
resentative sample of women who have had abortions, as those who respond to 
a survey from an organization dedicated to refuting the lie that “abortion is 
good and safe for women,”50 are far more likely than other women to attribute 
the difficulties in their lives to their abortion experience, thus “severely less-
en[ing] [the] generalizability” of their experiences.51 
Compounding the methodological problems with their testimonies, as 
Greenberg further points out, none of the 180 women whom responded to the 
Operation Outcry call for post-abortion narratives actually linked their emo-
tional grief to the aftermath of an intact D & E abortion. In fact there is nothing 
to indicate that any of them actually underwent this particular procedure, thus 
effectively making their testimonies “beside the point” vis-à-vis the actual issue 
before the Court.52 In addition, as Brianne J. Gorod points out, the Court “did 
not actually have the opportunity to hear these women testify;” accordingly, the 
“extra-record” facts embedded in their narratives were not tested by the rigors 
of the adversarial process, which might have revealed these shortcomings.53 
Moreover, although these excerpted portions are devoid of religious references, 
as discussed in greater detail below, many of the uncut testimonies are imbued 
with a deep religiosity. 
Speaking in what is clearly a rhetorical manner, Greenberg ponders wheth-
er it might have been possible that “the briefs and the available evidence were 
simply so one-sided that upholding the statute was the only reasonable path 
                                                        
47  Larsen, supra note 32, at 1796–98; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Counter-Factual 
Court: Brandeis Lecture, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville, March 
5, 2008, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 13 (2008); Moreno, supra note 35, at 509–13. 
48  Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 10, at 22. 
49  Id. at app. B. 
50  Who We Are, OPERATION OUTCRY, http://www.operationoutcrystories.org/about/who-we-
are [https://perma.cc/2RBR-N66G] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
51  Greenhouse, supra note 47, at 11–13, 16. This tracks Maroney’s content-focused objec-
tion to the Court’s reliance on these testimonies. See Maroney, supra note 12, at 897–99. 
52  Greenhouse, supra note 47, at 12. 
53  Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1, 2–8, 32–34 (2011). 
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open to the [Carhart] Court?”54 Quickly disposing of this possibility, she re-
veals that “[e]ven a cursory review of the impact of abortion on women’s lives 
demonstrates how selective Justice Kennedy was in marshaling and presenting 
his ‘facts.’ ”55 First, as she points out, the majority Justices had ready access to 
the almost one dozen scientific papers on the subject of post-abortion trauma 
that were cited by dissenting Justice Ginsberg, which challenge its conclusion 
regarding the unexceptional nature of abortion regret.56 Second, the Justices al-
so had access to the amicus brief of the American Medical Women’s Associa-
tion and the American Public Health Association, which poignantly documents 
that in instances of a wanted pregnancy that was terminated because of serious 
health considerations or fetal anomalies, an intact D & E procedure may “ ‘of-
fer[] psychological benefits’ as compared with second-trimester abortions that 
result in fetal dismemberment” as it allows “the patient ‘to see and hold the fe-
tus, and mourn its death.’ ”57 Finally, Greenberg reminds us that the Carhart 
majority could also have turned to the “amicus curiae brief that matched the 
[Justice Foundation’s] brief in offering personal testimonies, based on inter-
views with and letters from 150 women who underwent second-trimester abor-
tions,” documenting how, in the course of making their abortion decision, they 
“rel[ied] upon intimate moral, religious, and personal values to make the right 
decision[s] for themselves and their families.”58 
 Having reviewed these critiques of the Carhart decision, we now turn our 
attention to another deeply troubling dimension of the Court’s embrace of the 
abortion regret trope. As discussed in the following section, although presented 
to the Court as secular in nature, not only is the concept of abortion regret redo-
lent with religious meaning, it entered the Court’s jurisprudence by way of a 
divine revelation. 
II.    ABORTION REGRET: THE “DEVIL’S BARGAIN”59 
In 1996, David C. Reardon published the book Making Abortion Rare: A 
Healing Strategy for a Divided Nation, in which he called upon “pro-life” ac-
tivists to place the grieving women who had lost a child to abortion at the cen-
ter of their strategy to “create a culture where abortion is not just illegal, but is 
                                                        
54  Greenhouse, supra note 47, at 14. 
55  Id. at 13. 
56  Id. at 14. 
57  Id. at 14–15 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae American Medical Women’s Assn., Ameri-
can Public Health Ass’n. et al. in Support of Respondents at 15 n. 10). 
58  Id. at 15 (quoting Brief of the Institute for Reproductive Health Access et al. as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382), 
2006 WL 2736633, at *29). 
59  DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABORTION RARE: A HEALING STRATEGY FOR A DIVIDED 
NATION 109 (1996). 
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unthinkable.”60 Inspired by the woman-centered approach of counselors in cri-
sis pregnancy centers (“CPCs”),61 he hoped to channel their therapeutic narra-
tive regarding the emotional harms of abortion into a transformative strategy 
for realizing the movement’s ultimate goal of protecting the unborn. 
By way of a brief explanation, CPCs provide direct services to “abortion-
minded” women, including directive counseling, free material aide, such as di-
apers and formula, and evangelical missionizing, which are aimed at dissuading 
them from pregnancy termination. By steering them towards motherhood in a 
devout and deeply feminized space, counselors hope to save women from a 
predicted lifetime of abortion regret.62 For many CPC counselors, this work is 
rooted in their own personal embodied experience of abortion as a profoundly 
traumatizing event, which is typically rooted in their abiding belief that the de-
liberate termination of a pregnancy disrupts God’s gendered order of creation 
in which all babies are a divine gift and all women–loving mothers.63 
As Reva Siegel documents, this effort by Reardon and other male leaders 
to transform a therapeutic discourse that otherwise might “have remained em-
bedded in the movement’s crisis pregnancy centers”64 was a well-calculated 
strategic move designed to counter the growing perception that, in the words of 
Jack Wilke, President of the National Right to Life Committee, “pro-life people 
were not compassionate to women and that we were only ‘fetus lovers’ who 
abandoned the mother after the birth.”65 Accordingly, as Reardon explains in 
Making Abortion Rare, in order to convert the “ambivalent majority,” the 
movement must place the grieving “post-aborted” woman at the center of their 
antiabortion platform.66 In short, as he argues, the creation of a pro-life society 
requires battling the opposition on their “own turf.”67 
However, as Reardon somewhat ruefully acknowledges in the Introduction 
to Making Abortion Rare, prior to embarking on this evangelizing mission he 
faced the daunting task of persuading his colleagues that “post-abortion issues 
are the key to converting hearts—the key to winning the battle for life,”68 and 
                                                        
60  Id. at xv (emphasis in original). 
61  Id. at vii. 
62  See generally ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS (2008); Kimberly 
Kelly, In the Name of the Mother: Renegotiating Conservative Women’s Authority in the 
Crisis Pregnancy Center Movement, 38 SIGNS 203 (2012). 
63  For further discussion, including excerpts from interviews with CPC counselors, see 
Alesha Doan and J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, “Teaching Morality by Teaching Science:” Religios-
ity and Abortion Regret, in Reproductive Ethics: New Challenges and Conversations, Eds. 
Lisa Campo-Engelstein and Paul Burcher, (Forthcoming, 2017). 
64  Siegel, supra note 6, at 1714. 
65  Id. at 1716 (quoting John Wilke. Life Issues Institute is Celebrating Ten Years with a New 
Home, LIFE ISSUES INST. (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.lifeissues.org/2001/02/life-issues-insti 
tute-celebrating-ten-years-new-home [https://perma.cc/EX5Z-U3JF]). 
66  Reardon, supra note 59, at 28, 31; see infra notes 88–91. 
67  Id. at x (emphasis added). 
68  Id. at vii (emphasis in original). 
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that this strategic shift in focus would not undermine the “moral high ground of 
opposing abortion simply because all human life is sacred.”69 Accordingly, alt-
hough Reardon himself acknowledged the outcome was a forgone conclusion, 
he nonetheless proposed subjecting his proposition to a “moral examination” in 
order to establish that “the pro-woman approach is not only consistent with the 
pro-life moral imperative, it is, in fact, a fuller and more complete expression of 
it.”70 It is here, in Reardon’s moral examination of his proposed “pro-
woman/pro-life” strategy that the deep originating religiosity of abortion regret 
is first revealed. 
Reardon begins his moral inquiry with “a very simple observation,”—
namely, that “[i]n God’s ordering of creation, it is only the mother who can 
nurture her unborn child. All that the rest of us can do, then, is to nurture the 
mother.”71 Grounded in God’s dictate that “the best interests of the child and 
the mother are always joined,” he thus insists that “from a natural law perspec-
tive, we can know in advance that abortion is inherently harmful to women. It 
is simply impossible to rip a child from the womb of a mother without tearing 
out a part of the woman herself.”72 
 Having presumptively established that the “psychological complications of 
abortion” are the direct manifestation of a “moral problem,”73 Reardon further 
explains that a woman’s decision-making process regarding the outcome of a 
pregnancy is in fact a pitched battle between Christ and Satan over her fate. 
Pulling the woman in one direction, Christ urges her not to “do this thing,” and 
implores her to “[p]lace your hope in Me.”74 Pulling her in the opposite direc-
tion, Satan insists “[y]ou must get rid of it . . . . You have no choice. . . . Do this 
one thing and then you will be back in the driver’s seat of life.”75 
 However, Reardon reassuringly promises that all is not necessarily lost for 
the “desperate woman” who rejects God’s gift of life and instead follows Satan 
to the abortionist’s door. If she subsequently repents and embraces his gift of 
forgiveness, she will “escape from the tar pit of despair” in which she would 
otherwise be mired.76 On the other hand, if she is paralyzed by the “horror of 
[her] sin,”77 and thus does not believe she is deserving of God’s mercy, she will 
instead find herself consigned to a living hell where Satan seeks to “pump[] as 
much despair into [her life] as he can generate.”78 Standing now as her “fiercest 
                                                        
69  Id. at 3. 
70  Id. at 4. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. at 5. 
73  Id. at 10. 
74  Id. at 108. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 110–11. 
77  Id. at 109. 
78  Id. 
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accuser,” he taunts her that she is “beyond redemption . . . . There is no one 
who can love YOU—a murderer. You are alone,” and entreats her to escape 
this misery by seeking “what little comfort you can in the bottom of a booze 
bottle, in the silence of suicide, or in the embrace of an affair.”79 
As Reardon explains, this “devil’s bargain” by which Satan first encour-
ages a woman to abort and then fans the flames of despair, is aimed at separat-
ing her from God, and sending her spiraling towards atheism, which Reardon 
identifies as the “greatest tragedy of abortion.”80 Tracking Satan’s jeering ad-
monition that a woman’s only hope for comfort now lies in death, adultery, or 
addiction, Reardon likewise asserts that “annihilation of [the] self,” either 
through the literal act of suicide or through “death’s semblance in abusive rela-
tionships or the mind-deadening effects of drug or alcohol abuse,” is her only 
chance for escape from a life of despair.81 
 The concept of the “devil’s bargain” crystalizes the animating religiosity of 
Reardon’s proposed “pro-woman” antiabortion strategy. The tragic figure of 
the wounded “post-aborted” woman is the literal embodiment of Satan’s victo-
ry over God, and despair—the linear consequence of her repudiation of God’s 
sacred design for her life. He thus offers his colleagues the opportunity to step 
into the vaunted role of avenging angel come to wrest suffering womanhood 
from Satan’s vicious grasp in order to advance “the Christian renewal of our 
society.”82 As Reardon unabashedly exhorts his readers, his is a crusade for the 
“defense of human dignity and for the glory of God.”83 
Further elaborating on why post-abortion issues are central to the prolife 
mission, Reardon characterizes “women who grieve over their lost children,” as 
the most “compelling advocates of all for the unborn.”84 He thus proclaims that 
it will be through listening to their testimony that the ambivalent majority will 
finally be forced to acknowledge “the unborn for whom the tears are wept.”85 
Seeking to further harness the transformative power of the grief of “post-
aborted” women, Reardon exhorts the “pro-life movement and the Church” to 
create a healing environment to help them overcome their pain and sense of 
shame, both for their own benefit and, strategically, so they will feel empow-
ered to sue their abortionists for malpractice based on the systematic violation 
of their rights.86 Reardon thus confidently predicts that if women aggressively 
pursue this course of action, the risk of performing an abortion will become so 
great that “even if it remains legal, no physician will dare risk the liability of 
                                                        
79  Id. at 108–09 (emphasis in original). 
80  Id. at 109, 112. 
81  Id. at 112. 
82  Id. at 99. 
83  Id. at viii. 
84  Id. at 9, 14. 
85  Id. at 9. 
86  Id. at xii, 99–100. 
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performing one,” resulting in the eventual shut down of the “abortion indus-
try.”87 
Recognizing, however, that the nonbelievers who populate what he refers 
to as the “ambivalent majority” are not likely to be moved by this sacred mis-
sion, Reardon instead proposes reaching them through “an alternative way of 
evangelizing.”88 As he explains, since they are not likely to appreciate that a 
breach of God’s moral laws is “injurious to our happiness,” it is incumbent up-
on committed prolife activists to develop a secular research agenda that will 
“teach[] morality by teaching science.”89 In short, he argues that “if our faith is 
true, we would expect to find . . . that acts [such] as abortion . . . lead, in the 
end, not to happiness and freedom, but to sorrow and enslavement,”—a truth 
that can be presented as the result of a “scientific” research agenda, thereby en-
abling the prolife movement to “bear witness to the protective good of God’s 
law in a way which even unbelievers must respect.”90 Taking this a step further, 
he stresses that this “research and education” agenda is not “just grist for politi-
cal reform,” but is also “leaven for spiritual reform,” since, as “people become 
more aware of all the hardships abortion causes . . . they will begin to respect 
the wisdom of God’s law,” and thus recognize that “these religious folk weren’t 
so crazy after all.”91 
As we have just seen, the concept of abortion regret originated in the moral 
sphere in which natural law casts all children as wanted gifts from God, and all 
women as loving mothers; however, the Carhart Court emptied the concept of 
its sacred meaning. Nowhere in the decision do we get so much as a hint that 
despair signals Satan’s victory over God, leaving the “post-aborted” woman 
hurtling towards the “annihilation of the self.”92 Rather, regret takes center 
stage as a secular referent to women’s precarious emotionality. Of course, this 
divesture of religiosity is exactly what Reardon urged as a way to reach nonbe-
lievers who, at least initially, are unlikely to “acknowledge a moral truth for the 
love of God.”93 It is thus not surprising, as discussed in the following section, 
that the secularized amicus brief filed by the Justice Foundation relies upon the 
authority of Reardon in the guise of an irreligious expert on abortion regret 
                                                        
87  Id. at viii–ix. Prior to writing Making Abortion Rare, Reardon was commissioned by the 
staunchly antiabortion Life Dynamics to write a book entitled Abortion Malpractice for per-
sonal injury lawyers. 
88  Id. at 11. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  However, as discussed above, Maroney suggests that by placing regret in “close narrative 
conjunction with the invocation of mother-love,” the Court was quietly signaling its embrace 
of a view of the world that is compatible with this belief structure. Maroney, supra note 12, 
at 893–94. 
93  Reardon, supra note 59, at 11. 
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with no hint of his animating belief that post-abortion despair is the direct result 
of the “devil’s bargain.” 
III.   THE LORD INSTRUCTED ME TO BRING THE VOICES OF WOMEN 
HURT BY ABORTION TO THE SUPREME COURT 
In addition to the problematic nature of the Carhart Court’s invocation of 
the concept of regret to justify the imposition of limitations on women’s abor-
tion rights, which, as we have seen, emanates from a religious conception of 
abortion as disruptive of God’s gendered order of creation, like other commen-
tators, I too am deeply concerned about the Court’s reliance on the amicus curi-
ae brief filed by the Justice Foundation as its sole source of authority on post-
abortion harm. Building upon the above-discussed critiques, and tracking the 
focus of this paper, I direct my attention to the revelatory origins of this brief, 
which, as we will see, brought the voices of 180 “post-aborted” women to the 
Supreme Court as witnesses to the truth. 
In 2000, Allen Parker, an attorney and President of the Justice Foundation, 
was instructed by God to pursue a legal reform strategy aimed at ending the na-
tion’s covenant with death. Like Reardon’s plan to empower “women who 
grieve for their lost children” to bring malpractice actions against the doctors 
who performed their abortions, this divinely inspired plan also sought to deploy 
women’s embodied abortion experiences as the catalyst for legal change.94 
More specifically, as Parker recounts to his followers, as he was on his way 
home from the March for Life rally in Washington D.C., the Lord spoke to him 
in the Dallas-Fort Worth airport to inform him that “only through the testimo-
nies of women hurt by abortion could [they] refute the lie that abortion is good 
for women.”95 
The Lord subsequently instructed Parker to bring these testimonies to the 
Supreme Court in order to persuade the Justices, who, like Reardon’s ambiva-
lent majority, had been deceived into thinking that abortion helped women, 
“that you [cannot] take the life of your own child without it deeply impacting 
your soul, your body, your emotions.”96 The Lord also provided Parker with 
scriptures to confirm the importance of bringing the testimonies of aborted 
women before the Court. Significantly, as recounted by Parker, he included a 
passage from Isaiah, which he notes has long sustained the work of the Justice 
Foundation and its Operation Outcry ministry, predicting that “[h]ail shall 
                                                        
94  E-mail from Allan E. Parker, President, The Justice Foundation, to Shoshanna Ehrlich, 
author (Nov. 11, 2015, 5:49 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Parker E-mail 1]; see also 
Army of Justice Video: 39 Years of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, OPERATION OUTCRY, 
http://www.operationoutcrystories.org/2014/08/11/army-of-justice-video 
[https://perma.cc/B8Y4-9MXJ] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
95  Parker E-mail 1, supra note 94. 
96  39 Years of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, supra note 94. 
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sweep away the refuge of lies and the waters will overflow the hiding place. 
Your covenant with death will be annulled.”97 
Seeking to implement the Lord’s legal reform strategy, the Justice Founda-
tion accordingly filed its amicus brief in the Carhart case on behalf of Sandra 
Cano and 180 women “injured by abortion,” whose heartfelt stories of post-
abortion suffering are included in an appendix to the brief and excerpted in the 
body of the brief itself.98 Although the brief is silent about this divinely inspired 
pathway to the Court, according to Parker, these testimonies are the direct “fruit 
of that revelation.”99  
It is thus not surprising to find that the uncut testimonies in the appendix 
are laced with religious themes. While spiritually-oriented motifs are implicitly 
embedded in a number of the narratives of post-abortion grief, in which, for ex-
ample, women speak of their guilt at having murdered their child, or of the un-
born child’s humanity, approximately 20 percent of the testimonies contain ex-
plicit religious references.100 These attest to a fear of divine retribution, 
emotional distress over the loss of a relationship with God, and guilt at having 
intentionally interfered with God’s procreative plans. 
Capturing some of these unambiguously religious references, J.L.M., for 
example, explains that her overly protective relationship with her son emanates 
from her fear that “God could still punish me by taking this child away.”101 She 
goes on to explain that this fear has “mired my motivation and hindered my ca-
reer (ironically since my reasoning in part to have an abortion was so my career 
wouldn’t be hindered.)[.] It has cut the soul out of my entire life.”102 Although 
shorn of its religious references in the body of the brief, Donna M. Razin’s full 
testimony captures her highly freighted relationship with God following her 
abortion: 
Deep regret—initially I was suicidal—as the years have progressed I have de-
veloped a heightened level of bitterness and anger and self-hate. I feared God, 
have not been able to attend church because of my fear of God, unforgiveness, 
shame, guilt, condemnation, inability to bond and fit in with other women, ina-
bility to be intimate. The deep emotional scars were a large contributing factor 
in my divorce—a very, very catastrophic choice! Great sense of loss and 
grief.103 
Identifying another potent source of anguish, S.B.M.’s testimony cogently 
captures Reardon’s natural law ideology. As she writes: “For years, I was in 
                                                        
97  Parker E-mail 1, supra note 94. 
98  39 Years of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, supra note 94. 
99  Parker E-mail 1, supra note 94. 
100  This figure is based on a preliminary analysis conducted by the author together with 
Alesha Doan. 
101  Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 10, at app. B, 14. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. at app. B, 12. 
17 NEV. L.J. 599, EHRLICH - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  11:49 AM 
614 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:599  
denial, but I was bound by shame and guilt. It is the unspeakable deed and 
harms a woman deep to her core—As a woman, nurturer, child of God . . . it 
distorts the image of my life.”104 
Hewing, however, to Reardon’s admonition that the moral message of the 
prolife movement must be packaged in secular terms to reach those who do not 
appreciate that the violation of God’s law inevitably leads to “alienation and 
suffering,”105 the excerpts that are included in the body of the brief have either 
been stripped of religious referents or lacked them in the first place. However, 
as we have just seen, one need only turn to the full testimonies to realize that, 
despite the representation of post-abortion suffering as an earthly matter in the 
sanitized pages of the brief in main, the uncut testimonies provide accountings 
of grief that are redolent with sacred themes. 
The revelatory origins of the Justice Foundation’s amicus brief and the 
embedded religious motifs in the testimonies add another troubling layer to the 
already robust concerns discussed above regarding the Court’s reliance upon it 
to establish the unexceptional nature of abortion regret. Specifically, although 
on the surface the Justice Foundation presents itself as a secular organization, 
which “seeks to mobilize citizens, through financial and service contributions 
to provide free legal representation in landmark cases to protect and restore jus-
tice,”106 a review of the organization’s website, together with the linked website 
of its Operation Outcry ministry and Alan Parker’s organizational communica-
tions, makes clear that, at least where abortion is concerned, its wellspring of 
action is rooted in the divine. 
Turning first to the organization’s mission page, in addition to the above 
pronouncement regarding its commitment to protecting and restoring justice, 
the page also includes an embedded video asking viewers “whose side are you 
on?” and inviting them to join the Foundation’s “Army of Justice.”107 By way 
of inspiration, following a recitation of the historic good that God has done, in-
cluding, for example, the destruction of both communism and Hitler, viewers 
are informed that “God is sending a Deliverer who is greater than all the deliv-
erers of the past,” namely the “King of Kings” and the “Lord of Lords,” who is 
“coming to bring Justice to the Earth with an Army of the Redeemed,” (which 
undoubtedly includes recruits to the Army of Justice), and once again inquires 
of them “whose side are you on?”108 
The Justice Foundation’s website also includes a linked description of its 
Operation Outcry ministry, and is also directly hot-linked to Operation Out-
cry’s companion website. As the website makes clear, Operation Outcry’s sin-
                                                        
104  Id. at app. B, 50 (emphasis in original). 
105  Reardon, supra note 59, at 11. 
106  Mission Statement, JUSTICE FOUND., http://thejusticefoundation.org/mission-statement 
[https://perma.cc/N5KH-2N47] (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
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gular mission is “to end the pain of abortion by exposing the truth about its 
devastating impact on women, men and families . . . through prayer and with 
the testimonies of women and men who have suffered harm from abortion.”109 
Tracking Reardon’s message regarding the importance of post-abortion heal-
ing, Operation Outcry also offers “hope, healing and forgiveness through 
Christ-centered, Biblically-based abortion recovery programs,” to those “suf-
fering in silence from their secret shame and guilt.”110 
  Further underscoring the deeply religious orientation of the Justice Foun-
dation, Allen Parker, who describes himself in a video on the Operation Outcry 
website as a “born again Christian who trusts in Jesus Christ as his savior,”111 
signs the e-mails that he sends in his capacity as the President of the Founda-
tion “Advancing Life, Liberty, and Justice in Him.”112 His communications are 
also saturated with religious references. For example, in a 2015 e-mail entitled 
“Praise Report,” he begins by informing his readers that “Things have been in-
credibly busy and blessed at The Justice Foundation. We are praising God for 
many miracles and His miraculous provision in amazing ways.”113 In what he 
then denotes as an “URGENT!” request, he asks his readers to “pray that the 
Supreme Court take the appropriate cases [at the time, cases were on appeal to 
the Court from Arkansas, Mississippi, North Dakota and Texas] that God wants 
them to take to change the constitutional protection for abortion.”114 
 As we now know, the Court chose to review the case of Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt from Texas, in which it ultimately invalidated statutory 
provisions that held abortion clinics to the standards of ambulatory surgical 
centers and required doctors who performed abortions to have hospital admit-
ting privileges.115 On the day the decision was handed down, the Justice Foun-
dation issued a press release characterizing the result as a “crime[] against hu-
manity,” which, again quoting Isaiah, apocryphally warned: 
Without massive repentance America is doomed as a nation. We are going to 
experience much more destruction and more terror and the probable elimination 
of America as a nation. But God is still saying “America, return to me and I will 
return to you.” But time is very short. . . . [T]he words of Isaiah still ring true to-
day that God himself says, “Your covenant with death will be annulled, your 
                                                        
109  Operation Outcry, JUSTICE FOUND., http://thejusticefoundation.org/cases/operation-outcry 
[https://perma.cc/YN3F-QTLE] (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (emphasis added). 
110  OPERATION OUTCRY, supra note 50 (emphasis added). 
111  39 Years of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, supra note 94. 
112  See, e.g., E-mail from Allan Parker, President, The Justice Foundation, to Shoshanna 
Ehrlich, author (Dec. 21, 2015, 9:06 AM) (on file with author). 
113  E-mail from Allan Parker, President, The Justice Foundation, to Shoshanna Ehrlich, au-
thor (Nov. 16, 2015, 2:33 PM) (on file with the author). 
114  Id. 
115  136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
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agreement with the grave will not stand” and “it will be sheer terror to under-
stand the message.”116 
And in a same-day e-mail communiqué to supporters, Parker also issued a 
stern cautionary message about the likely consequences of this decision: 
       There is not much fear of the Lord left in the land, or even more sadly, in 
ourselves as the Body of Christ. There needs to be! I believe the Day of the Lord 
is coming, a day of burning like an oven. . . . So fear God, and do not give up on 
doing good!117 
He therefore advised them that “The only way to prepare fully for the dis-
aster ahead is to know Jesus as your Savior and Lord! (Boss!).”118 
CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court’s reliance on amicus briefs to estab-
lish social facts raises the serious concern that “[w]ithout the procedural safe-
guards employed at the trial level, scientific and other evidence of questionable 
validity can easily find its way into [a] case.”119 Nonetheless, once the Court 
makes a factual finding, such as it made in the Carhart case regarding the un-
exceptional nature of abortion regret with its ensuing depression and loss of es-
teem, it may well become “embedded in the law as [an] immutable statement[] 
of reality,” and treated as “gospel” by lower courts despite the possibility of a 
shaky evidentiary foundation.120 Exemplifying this problematic phenomena, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, recently cited Carhart for the 
proposition that “ ‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow’ an abor-
tion,”121 as the basis for upholding a state law requiring that women seeking an 
abortion be warned of an “[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide,” thus 
further entrenching a deeply religious and divinely inspired understanding of 
women’s post-abortion experiences into law.122 
Although advocacy groups who file amicus briefs certainly do so with the 
hope of influencing legal outcomes, political scientists have further observed 
that they may also do as well in order to “strengthen ties with their constituents 
                                                        
116  Press Release, The Justice Foundation, Supreme Court Commits Crimes (June, 27, 
2016), http://thejusticefoundation.org/category/news/press-release [https://perma.cc/PL7U-A 
E3K] (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (citation omitted). 
117  E-mail from Alan E. Parker, President, The Justice Foundation, to Shoshanna Ehrlich, 
author (June 27, 2016, 2:25 PM) (on-file with the author). 
118  Id. 
119  Borgman, supra note 36, at 1216. 
120  Gorod, supra note 53, at 63–66 (discussing the uncertainty regarding the extent to which 
lower courts “are—or should be—bound by higher courts’ factual findings”); see also, 
Borgman, supra note 36, at 1216–18. 
121  Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 899 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007)). 
122  Id. at 892 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii)). 
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and to contribute to organizational unity.”123 In short, the primary audience may 
actually be “the membership of the group sponsoring the brief.”124 Of particular 
relevance here, a citation in a Supreme Court decision may offer legitimacy to a 
group, and signal that it “has ‘access’ to or ‘influence’ with the Court,” which 
can, in turn, be used “to obtain new members and contributions.”125 
This is certainly born out in the present case. Notably, in the wake of the 
Carhart decision, a Justice Foundation memo proudly proclaimed that “The 
Court is listening.”126 The memo went on to “thank the Lord for the progress 
being made,” with respect to the Court’s willingness to listen for the first time 
to the “ ‘wailing women’ who can ‘teach our nation to mourn’ for children lost 
to abortion,” thus extolling the group’s ability to influence the Court.127 Rein-
forcing this implicit message, the memo also proudly announced that the “rul-
ing is an invitation to provide further evidence of the harm of abortion.”128 
 Directly relevant here is an intriguing argument made by Tiffany Ferris—if 
one regards the citation of an amicus brief as a performative act by which the 
Court is actively signaling its endorsement of the filing organization’s views, 
then the “mere act of citation, of naming a religious amici in an opinion” may 
“run[] afoul of the Court’s own Establishment Clause jurisprudence” as it is 
sending a clear message of support “for the religion with which that organiza-
tion is inextricably and clearly linked.”129 Whether or not the citation of an 
amicus brief filed by an organization, such as the Justice Foundation, actually 
constitutes an endorsement of its views in violation of the Establishment clause, 
what is significant here is that through its citation the Court has implicitly em-
braced a particularized understanding of the emotional consequences of abor-
tion that is saturated with religious meaning. It is imperative that we recognize 
the woman-protective antiabortion argument for what it truly is—a religious 
assault on a woman’s right to control her reproductive fate based on the belief 
that abortion is a deliberate repudiation of God’s gendered map of the uni-
verse—that is currently working its way into our legal and political discourse as 
a legitimate secular rationale for limiting women’s right to abortion.  
                                                        
123  Steven Puro, The Role of the Amicus Curiae in the United States Supreme Court: 1920–
1966, at 247 (Feb. 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at 
Buffalo) (on file with author). 
124  Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 824 (2000); see also, Lee Epstein, Interest Group 
Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639, 639 (1993). 
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126  Operation Outcry Testimony Influences Four Major Court Victories!, JUSTICE FOUND., 
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